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Introduction
The fall of the ‘iron curtain’ resulted in a massive and 
quite spontaneous mobilisation of actors and resources, 
boosting signifi cant economic and social transformation. In 
the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries,1 the idea 
of ‘catching up with the West’ became a fundamental under-
pinning of rural policies, attracting a broad variety of stake-
holders to get involved. Contrasting the discredited socialist 
status quo, ‘Western’ values became here the new points of 
reference. ‘Western models’, it was hoped, would offer ade-
quate solutions to burning issues in the CEE countries. After 
the political changes, in the early 1990s both Hungary and 
Poland were characterised by a systematic reorganisation 
of economic and social life and searching for new ways to 
handle rural issues. Many new initiatives and projects were 
implemented that attempted to tackle socio-economic prob-
lems of the countryside by channelling foreign aid, a process 
widely supported by ‘Western’ nations.
The 2004 European Union (EU) enlargement challenged 
the national rural policy systems2 of the New Member 
States (NMS) in many ways, provoking confl icts between 
the political and institutional cultures of the old regimes and 
the emerging new approaches. Hungary and Poland, as path-
dependent former socialist countries in CEE, are similar in 
many aspects relevant to rural policies (such as the preva-
lence of rural population and the strong dependence of the 
economy on the agricultural sector). Moreover, they have 
close historic links and a tradition of mutual support in vari-
ous policy arenas that has continued to the present day (see 
for instance ENRD, 2012). Nevertheless, they are very dif-
ferent in many other ways (size, geography, total population, 
urbanisation, administrative structures etc.) and highly path-
dependent in their own cultural and institutional contexts. 
Especially one may note that Poland has more large urban 
1 In this paper the term Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries refers to the 
ten countries in the region that joined the European Union in the mid-2000s.
2 In this paper we understand rural policy as an evolutionary policy, forming a part 
of multiple frameworks, especially the CAP, territorial and cohesion policies and do-
mestic approaches.
agglomerations than Hungary, which affects the positioning 
of rural areas in the overall transformation (development) 
discourse, making the urban and industrial lobby stronger in 
the fi rst case.
From the late 1980s, the EU repeatedly failed to reform 
signifi cantly the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The 
start of the new Millennium brought Agenda 2000 with the 
hope of ‘injecting’ more sustainability into the system. It 
was also a preparation for embracing much greater diversity 
which, especially in social and economic terms, was a conse-
quence of the 2004 EU enlargement. During the early phases 
of the negotiations for EU accession, for a while, CEE coun-
try governments seemed to be willing to accept a differently 
structured rural policy package compared to the EU-15. This 
could have meant lower direct payments and a signifi cantly 
higher share of rural development funding, if they received 
the expected fi nancial aid in some way. Thus, during the 
design of Agenda 2000, for a historic moment, there was a 
chance that the Eastern enlargement could become a global 
experiment to change fundamentally EU rural policy into a 
more sustainable direction. Nevertheless, this chance was 
lost, as Agenda 2000 materialised as only a slight incremen-
tal reform of the CAP and most NMS turned out to be strong-
holds of the old industrial agricultural approach.
This study critically reviews the post-socialist transfor-
mation concerning rural development. We use Poland and 
Hungary as examples and concentrate mainly on the evolu-
tion of rural policies in these two countries as a consequence 
of Europeanisation. In the wider literature Europeanisation 
is both enthusiastically and critically depicted by schol-
ars, and often burdened with blurred or even contradictory 
meanings (Lackowska-Madurowicz, 2011). For instance 
Bache (2008) views it as a top-down process of EU policy 
‘downloading’ by Member States. Börzel (2002), presenting 
a broader vision, combines downloading with ‘uploading’ of 
the domestic policy frameworks. Moreover, Europeanisation 
can be synonymous with EU policy learning (de la Porte and 
Pochet, 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). In the rural 
policy context, Page (2003) and Gorton et al. (2009) consider 
Anna AUGUSTYN* and NEMES Gusztáv**
Catching up with the West? Europeanisation of rural policies in 
Hungary and Poland
This paper presents a comparative perspective on Europeanisation of rural policies in Poland and Hungary. We focus on 
developments in these two countries in the last decade and situate them in a broader European Union (EU) narrative. This 
exercise shows that Europeanisation in rural development has been mostly a one-way process of transferring the EU-15 policy 
models into the post-socialist realm. The policy system has lacked contextual sensitivity and recognition of the signifi cant dif-
ferences in political and institutional cultures both within the Central and Eastern European countries and between the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ EU Member States. The results are low effectiveness of development aid, coupled with the lack of policy learning and the 
possibility for gradual improvements of the system. We look here especially at the delivery of LEADER and how its transforma-
tion from being an experimental bottom-up innovation into a mainstream delivery mechanism of rural policy has affected its 
transfer to Hungary and Poland. We conclude with some recommendations for improvements in rural policy delivery and with 
some research questions to encourage further research.
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy, governance, LEADER, welfare state decline, post-socialist transformation
* Wrzeciono 8/38, 01961 Warszawa, Poland. Corresponding author: annamaria.augustyn@yahoo.com
** Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Közgazdaság-Tudományi Intézet, Budapest, Hungary.
Europeanisation of rural policies in Hungary and Poland
115
Europeanisation as a homogenisation affecting economic 
and political structures, while shaping the CAP. Others (e.g. 
Copus and de Lima, 2014) describe it as the integration pro-
cess of particular Member States into the EU policies. Here, 
apart from the CAP, an account is particularly being taken of 
a broader framework and notions of EU rural policies, such 
as territorial cohesion or urban-rural linkages.
Methodology and research questions
This comparative study uses triangulation based on lit-
erature survey, evidence from two research projects3 and 
participant observation by the authors through direct engage-
ment in rural policy consultancy over the last 15 years. The 
essential part of this qualitative inquiry was semi-structured 
interviews with experts involved in the delivery of rural pol-
icy in both countries (15 in total, representing the public and 
NGO sectors), focused on the design process of the 2007-
2013 Rural Development Programmes (RDPs) and particu-
larly on its institutional side. While the objectives of both 
projects were much wider in scope, concerning rural policies 
across the EU, for this study we concentrated on the adoption 
of EU rural policy through the LEADER approach in Hun-
gary and Poland. We present some results of this inquiry and 
contribute to the debate about the following questions: (a) 
was the ten years that have passed since the Eastern enlarge-
ment suffi cient to ‘Europeanise’ rural policies in Hungary 
and Poland; and (b) what have been the main obstacles to 
policy learning?
Challenging old regimes – new rural 
policies in the CEE countries
The post-socialist transformation has been subject to 
various coordination attempts over the last two decades. 
Agriculture, rural areas and their most important stakehold-
ers have undergone radical changes. An essential part of the 
transformative agenda was the establishment of new institu-
tions and governance structures for the delivery of EU aid. 
Yet, the desired transformation towards Western values and 
living standards was not without problems and provoked 
ongoing debates and confl icts between stakeholder groups 
(Augustyn 2009a). In our view, at least two major phases 
of the post-socialist transformation of rural policy could be 
distinguished when describing these processes: (a) explora-
tory (from the end of 1980s until the EU accession in 2004) 
and (b) adaptive (after 2004 and still ongoing).
The crucial element that differentiates these two phases 
in our analytical framework is the notion of rural policy 
(Table 1). As observed by Adamowicz (2000), during the 
exploratory period of the 1990s, in the post-socialist countries 
rural policies were less apparent and uncoordinated, while 
approaching the accession to the EU rural development pol-
icy became a compulsory part of the Europeanisation agenda 
3  RuDI (http://www.rudi-europe.net/), funded by the European Commission through 
the Seventh Framework Programme for Research (FP7), and Transleader (http://trans-
leader.webnode.hu/), funded by the Hungarian National Rural Network.
. The growing emphasis on this, however, cannot be simply 
explained by the accession of the NMS to the EU, as it was 
emerging in parallel with the so-called Pillar II of the CAP. 
Backed by important reforms (such as Agenda 2000 that cre-
ated Pillar II), rural policy was becoming an essential instru-
ment to channel EU funding into rural areas. Traditionally 
concentrated around agricultural production, the CAP under 
Pillar II began to emphasise multifunctionality of agriculture 
and the benefi ts that rural development can bring to a wider 
society in terms of public goods, environmental services and 
economic diversifi cation. Nevertheless, it is still disputed if 
Pillar II is a real innovation dealing with rural development 
or rather an extension of the Pillar I payments (Dwyer et al. 
2007; Copus and Dax, 2010). On the contrary, the instru-
ments of cohesion and territorial policies offered a broader 
scope of intervention, embracing policy sectors other than 
agriculture (Ward and Brown, 2009; Dax, 2014).
Institutional changes have been at the heart of both phases 
within this overall transformation in the former ‘Eastern 
Bloc’. In the 1990s, following the offi cial end of socialism, 
agriculture and rural development in the newly emerging 
democracies were principally shaped by a number of multi-
lateral agencies and donors (such as USAID, World Bank, 
FAO and UNDP). In the new Millennium, the EU became 
the key driver in this process. Its institutions, networks and 
values were gradually adopted by the NMS. The overall allo-
cation of public expenditure for the 2007-2013 RDPs had 
been so far the largest rural policy funding mechanism in the 
CEE countries. It amounted to EUR 5.3 billion in Hungary, 
EUR 17.4 billion in Poland (the latter being largest EU and 
NMS benefi ciary), whereas EUR 151.5 billion was distrib-
uted among the EU-27. These sound volumes of fi nancial 
aid were greeted with huge enthusiasm and mobilisation of 
stakeholders at all levels.
On the other hand, with the EU accession and adaptation 
of its policy delivery models the enthusiasm of the 1990s’ 
transformative phase quickly burnt out. To absorb available 
EU funding became a prime objective and rural stakeholders 
gradually adapted to functioning within a ‘contract culture’. 
Programmes, projects, targets and deliverables in a manage-
rialist manner began to replace the endogenous, voluntary 
developmental spirit. Civil movements in Poland and Hun-
Table 1: Some common features of the two phases of rural policy 
evolution in Hungary and Poland since 1989.
Exploration (1989-2004) Adaptation (after 2004)
Rural policy 
regime
Lack of a dedicated rural 
policy, rather within agri-
cultural and social policies
Rural policy evident in 
rhetoric, offi cial documents 
and stakeholder actions
Funding 
sources
Development cooperation 
with multi-lateral donors, 
especially USA and EU 
(pre-accession funds)
EU through the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development
Key policy 
objectives
Oriented on satisfying 
national needs, lack of 
stakeholder consultations
Oriented on EU and policy 
delivery and targets set up 
by most infl uential stake-
holders
Key change 
agents
Bottom-up grassroots ini-
tiatives, mainly NGOs
Policy networks coordinated 
by public institutions
Coordination Lack of coordination Evolving managerialist coor-
dination and ‘project state’
Source: own composition
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gary professionalised rapidly, increasing their independence 
in their immediate environment, but becoming more and 
more dependent on the external donor – the EU. At the same 
time, the actual delivery of rural policies posed numerous 
obstacles, such as increasing control requirements, lack of 
pre-fi nancing for projects and ineligibility of VAT for public 
stakeholders. The growing complexity of the policy deliv-
ery system resulted in an expansion of public administration 
and led to its domination over the process. Unhappily, as 
reported by Nemes et al. (2014), extended bureaucracy was 
often incompatible with the capacities of rural actors, espe-
cially those at the local level.
Funding from the EU also posed a signifi cant challenge 
to public fi nances in Hungary and Poland in terms of co-
fi nancing. A quick look at the core policy documents – RDPs4 
and National Strategy Plans5 – reveals that Poland treated the 
EU funding as a dominant source of rural development sup-
port (EAFRD contribution: 52.8 per cent in Poland c.f. 45.4 
per cent in Hungary). Co-fi nancing rural development at the 
domestic level shows certain weaknesses in public fi nances 
in both countries: only 16.1 per cent in Hungary and 15.9 
per cent in Poland was dedicated to RDPs as domestic pub-
lic contribution. The missing sources were mainly sought 
from the private sector: 38.5 per cent in Hungary and 31.3 
per cent in Poland. In order to fulfi l co-fi nancing require-
ments, as per the EU legislation, both countries thus had to 
prioritise the allocation of funding to those sectors that could 
attract greater private contribution. In contrast, in most of 
the EU-15 Member States the input of domestic co-fi nancing 
was greater, with the highest contribution in Finland – 58.7 
per cent (for detailed statistics see Copus, 2010). As a result, 
agricultural competitiveness and modernisation (Axis 1) 
and to a lesser extent agri-environmental concerns (Axis 2) 
became the main objectives of rural policies, receiving the 
vast majority of funding in both Hungary and Poland. Thus, 
compared to the EU-15 relatively little focus was placed 
on socio-economic aspects in Axes 3 and 4, and on capac-
ity building offered under the Technical Assistance measure 
(ibid.). These details well indicate that though the EU acces-
sion brought signifi cant fi nancial resources, new objectives 
and institutions and practically overruled rural policies in 
CEE countries, they did not change the infl uence of agricul-
tural lobbies or the emphasis on industrial agriculture.
Transferring the ‘new paradigm’ – 
multi-level governance and project 
state
Acclaimed by the OECD in its famous study on the New 
Rural Paradigm (OECD, 2006), decentralised, multi-level 
governance (MLG) and network governance were promoted 
as essential elements of the reformed CAP and rural policy 
in general. The New Rural Paradigm suggests using public 
money for investment rather than subsidies and in its new role 
4 Agrár és Vidékfejlesztési Operatív Program, Nemzeti Fejlesztési Terv 2007-2013 
in Hungary and Program Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich 2007-2013 in Poland.
5 Új Magyarország Fejlesztési Terv 2007-2013 in Hungary and Krajowy Plan Stra-
tegiczny Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich na lata 2007-2013 in Poland.
the state acts as a co-ordinator, manager or enabler rather than 
as a provider and director. In Europe generally, the MLG per-
spective reveals that much of rural policy has shifted outside 
direct state control. However, this was followed by increas-
ing bureaucratic burdens (Shucksmith, 2012) and manage-
rialist practices of institutional control (Ray, 2000) such as 
formal targets, contracts and performance indicators. All this 
entails a new operational logic for policy design and delivery 
that is of the ‘project state’ (Nemes et al., 2014). Resulting 
from a systematic incorporation into public administration 
and policy delivery systems, this approach became the new 
operational logic for rural development by the Millennium. 
Thus, when CEE countries were preparing for EU accession, 
they had to demonstrate their capacity to accommodate this 
approach in their administrative and policy systems. This 
resulted in an increasing focus on governance mechanisms, 
reforms for decentralisation and the introduction of multi-
level territorial self-governments in most post-socialist 
countries. Nevertheless, the functioning of multi-level gov-
ernance is deeply rooted in culture, democratic traditions and 
social institutions that cannot be created overnight.
Delivery systems in CEE countries, including Hungary 
and Poland, continued to be dominated by path-dependent 
hierarchic modes of governance (Wasielewski, 2009; Cheva-
lier and Maurel, 2013). As some authors suggest, with contin-
uing dependency on the agricultural sector and ruling elites 
partly from the former socialist system, in the CEE countries 
institutional changes have remained a façade in nature. The 
adoption of LEADER looks rather like a modifi cation of the 
old paradigm than genuine, structural change (Nemes, 2005; 
Kovách and Kučerová, 2009). Thus, for instance, when 
examining decentralised policy delivery and the presence of 
actors from various sectors in the offi cial discourse, multi-
level governance seems to be functioning. However, in prac-
tice, lower levels are only given autonomy from a legal per-
spective, but lack suffi cient capacities, fi nancial resources, 
networks and information to fulfi l their growing tasks. The 
essential component of well-performing governance – trust 
– is almost completely lacking from the system. Instead, the 
tyranny of central bureaucracy, excessive controls, red tape 
and formal top-down transparency prevails.
As shown for Hungary by Pálné Kovács (2012), the bar-
riers for introducing a new local governance system arose 
within the socio-economic context. It seems that when trans-
ferring ‘Western models’ into post-socialist space profound 
differences, particularly the lack of culture of decentralisa-
tion and local democratic traditions, were not suffi ciently 
taken into account. According to Gorton et al. (2009), four 
key factors may have hindered effective targeting of the 
CAP in the post-socialist countries, namely “(1) the lack 
of convergence between the socio-economic conditions of 
rural areas in the NMS and those in established Member 
States; (2) differences in farm structures in terms of both 
size and organisational type; (3) an inappropriate balance 
of resources between Pillar I and Pillar II of the CAP; and 
(4) inadequate (institutional) capacity to implement rural 
development measures in the NMS” (p.1306). Furthermore, 
issues of territorial cohesion, balanced spatial development 
or urban-rural interrelations also played here a profound role 
(Copus and Van Well, 2014; Dax, 2014).
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As observed in the RuDI studies, the trouble may also 
be linked with the legal responsibility for policy delivery 
that remains with centralised Managing Authorities, being 
normally ministries (Wiesinger and Dax, 2008; Augustyn, 
2009b). In addition, the majority of institutional actors hav-
ing actual infl uence over the shape of the 2007-2013 RDPs 
are situated at the level of the central government and within 
the public sector. Only a limited number of them originate 
from the private and NGO sectors. Hence, the outcomes of 
rural policies in both countries are especially oriented to cor-
respond with the priorities of the dominant stakeholders.
The unequal proportions of institutional actors by type 
and input in decision making processes are likely to pose a 
challenge to the system’s equilibrium. This has been mani-
fested by frequent confl icts, where NGOs accused central-
ised public stakeholders for the lack of an open consultation 
process over policy priorities. Furthermore, the weakness of 
institutions may be seen as a key obstacle to effective design 
and delivery of rural policies and focal point for transfer of 
the ‘Western’ models. We agree here with Mantino (2010), 
that it is a real challenge to understand “how institutional 
diversity and constraints can infl uence the process of learn-
ing and adapting policy instruments in different contexts. So 
when the EU introduces a new measure or approach in the 
common tool box, we are unable to say what it implies in 
the different contexts in terms of institutional implementa-
tion and adaptation” (p.18). As shown by RuDI studies on 
Hungary and Poland, the dominant policy drivers in the rural 
arena are normally strong central actors with quick access 
to relevant and often confi dential policy knowledge. ‘Old’ 
institutions and regimes still tend to focus their efforts on 
preserving their power and control over the emerging ben-
efi ts from rural policy. The access of new players and their 
points of view in offi cial policy debates is hindered by estab-
lished and often informal networks of actors within closed-
loop policy systems.
Transferring the LEADER programme
Emerging as a voluntary, bottom-up approach, the EU 
LEADER programme from 1991 onwards quickly turned 
into an integrated element of offi cial EU rural policy. It was 
originally intended as an innovative experiment – a ‘real 
life laboratory’ for the New Rural Paradigm. With time, ele-
ments of the LEADER method6 became inherent parts of 
an increasing number of EU policies, through mainstream-
ing into RDPs, and more recently, Community-Led Local 
Development (CLLD)7. The mainstreaming of LEADER, the 
increase in fi nances, the growing number of LAGs across the 
EU and its transfer into other policy sectors refl ects the wide 
acknowledgement of decision makers that the ‘LEADER 
method’ actually works. Nevertheless, since LEADER II 
more and more concerns have been raised about increasing 
bureaucratisation of the approach and loss of its original 
spirit (High and Nemes, 2007; Dwyer et al., 2010). During 
6 Local participation based on public private partnership, rural focus, multi-sectoral 
approach, networking etc.
7 CLLD is the new term coined for LEADER-type activities. It allows for applica-
tion of activities typical for LEADER not only in rural areas, but also in urban and 
urban-rural ones, and use of multiple EU funds.
the two decades of its existence, LEADER has evolved from 
a truly bottom-up civil society initiative towards an increas-
ingly top-down policy tool. The price of growth in budget 
and geographical coverage was a growing bureaucratic bur-
den on policy delivery, leading to massive disenchantments 
of stakeholders. This observation was also backed by EU 
documents, such as the report of the European Court of Audi-
tors (ECA, 2010), which critically reviews mainstreaming 
LEADER into RDPs. At the same time the European Com-
mission replies in this report that the overall exercise was 
too far decentralised, thus its effectiveness shifted beyond 
the direct EU scope of intervention towards responsibility 
of particular Member States / regions. It became clear that 
many of these did not have suffi cient capabilities to deal with 
this radical change, either in the ‘old’ and especially in the 
NMS, since the latter started their experience with LEADER 
only at the ‘advanced’ stage of the approach lifecycle.
The NMS missed the opportunity to participate in the 
experimental phase of LEADER happening at the time of the 
early transformation phase of post-socialist regimes. In that 
period the LEADER programme projected strong and effec-
tive messages promoting social innovation, empowerment, 
bottom-up processes, participation and decentralisation. 
These messages were very much in line with the post social-
ist democratic evolution and awoke high expectations. Rural 
society in both Hungary and Poland were very much expect-
ing the actual implementation of LEADER. However, by 
2004 (and especially in the 2007-2013 programming period) 
CEE countries met LEADER as a mature policy tool that had 
ceased to be an experiment. Without the suffi cient time for 
learning and the development of institutions, networks and 
common knowledge, post-socialist countries had to catch 
up with the new, mainstreamed LEADER programme faster 
than their more experienced counterparts in the EU-15.
Hungary and Poland, however, had the opportunity to 
try out LEADER as a rural policy tool earlier than other 
post-socialist countries and served as a ‘laboratory’ before 
LEADER was introduced across CEE. In both countries 
experiments started already in the pre-accession period. 
During the preparation for the SAPARD programme, in rural 
Hungary voluntary local development micro-regions, partly 
based on the LEADER method, were established, having far 
reaching effects on rural society (Nemes, 2003), and a ‘pilot 
LEADER Programme’ with 12 LAGs was implemented 
in 2002-2004. In Poland the ‘idea of piloting’ was initially 
rejected by central decision makers and was introduced only 
after intensive lobbying by civil society in 2004-2006. Prior 
to this, a similar territorial development model aimed at con-
necting local business with civil society was introduced8. 
In parallel regional rural development offi ces were estab-
lished that were closely linked with the public authorities 
(Augustyn, 2009a, 2009b).
After EU accession, during the last two years of the 2000-
2006 programming period, both countries were thoroughly 
implementing LEADER+ as an integrated part of their 
RDPs, however, with signifi cant differences. Poland decided 
to run the programme in two pilot phases, concentrating on 
capacity building, social learning networking establishing 
8 This programme was rooted in the US experiences and was called the Community 
Foundations approach.
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some 150 LAGs, but without the distribution of signifi cant 
development aid. In contrast, Hungary set up a fully-fl edged 
programme, where altogether 70 LAGs were established 
that created and implemented their local development strate-
gies. The programme had a budget of EUR 25 million that 
was much higher than in most other EU Member States 
and was only exceeded by Poland (EUR 30 million). The 
vast majority of this money was earmarked in Hungary for 
the implementation of local strategies (fi nancing projects). 
At the same time a signifi cant share of the total funds was 
reserved for communication. A national network unit (the 
Hungarian LEADER Centre), working as an observatory, 
was created and managed until the end of the programme. 
Comparing Poland and Hungary the ex-post evaluation of 
LEADER+ revealed that in the former the implementation 
of the approach had a slower, more gradual and bottom-up 
character than in the latter. It seems also that in Hungary 
there was more rush to absorb a relatively large amount of 
funding (Metis, 2010).
In the subsequent programming period (2007-2013), 
LEADER in Hungary and Poland encountered new obsta-
cles in the form of the RDP mainstreaming. The chal-
lenge became thus to embrace the complexity of the whole 
2007-2013 RDPs. The budget was hugely extended in both 
countries, and the geographic coverage of the programme 
in Hungary became 100 per cent of rural areas. Alongside 
this, however, the bureaucratic burden became much more 
explicit and political, and economic stakeholders and lobbies 
became interested in the programme and entered the strug-
gle for infl uence over resources, institutions and control. 
The state in Hungary and Poland could not operate in the 
pragmatic and effi cient ways of a ‘project state’ and instead 
of subsidiarity enhanced bureaucratic control was applied, 
often leading to disappointment and ineffi ciency. This might 
be also the reason for different speed of funding uptake9. For 
instance, by the end of 2013, 66 per cent of allocated funds 
in Hungary and 59 per cent in Poland were spent on Meas-
ure 431. Even so, the much bigger number of Polish LAGs 
(336) than Hungarian (96) may have posed a challenge to the 
administrative system, thus slowing down the policy deliv-
ery. Compared with the rest of the EU, both countries have 
been very slow to achieve their planned outputs (Chevalier, 
2012). According to data from RDP progress snapshots pre-
pared by the ENRD (see ENRD measures infosheets) by the 
end of 2013 Hungary had utilised approximately 33 per cent 
of the total public expenditure programmed for LEADER, 
while Poland reached 42 per cent, nearing the EU-27 aver-
age (46.7 per cent). However, Hungary reached 75 per 
cent of the expected number of benefi ciaries while Poland 
reached only 27 per cent. Unlike LEADER, the expenditure 
for other RDP axes and the programme as a whole was much 
faster (71 per cent of RDP total planned expenditure was uti-
lised in Poland, c.f. 67 per cent in Hungary), and Axes 1 and 
2 were especially popular. Thus, the low priority given to 
LEADER and Axis 3 in both budgeting and actual spending 
may be one of the key reasons why operation of the approach 
became so diffi cult in Hungary and Poland.
9 See ENRD Measures Information Sheets: http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/policy-in-ac-
tion/rural-development-policy-in-fi gures/measures-information-sheets/en/measures-
information-sheets_en.cfm.
The effects of LEADER in Central and Eastern Europe, 
including Poland and Hungary, have been far less than 
expected at the time of EU enlargement. The reasons are man-
ifold. Numerous authors point to diverse pathologies of the 
approach in post-socialist practice, such as dominance of pub-
lic authorities, persistence of old elites, lack of decentralisa-
tion, failing multi-level governance structures, administrative 
burdens or lack of effective evaluation (Katona Kovács et al., 
2006; High and Nemes, 2007; Augustyn, 2009c; Knieć, 2009; 
Wasielewski, 2009; Kovách et al., 2012; Fałkowski, 2013). 
Low social capital has also been pointed to by scholars as the 
key obstacle to effective LEADER delivery (Goszczyński, 
2009; Megyesi 2012). Our interviews in both Hungary and 
Poland underlined the weaknesses of the central public 
administration in dealing with highly complex policy process, 
which is particularly burdened by interests of political par-
ties and economic interests holding power. We also found that 
subsidiarity is very weak. Important decisions (on allocation 
of funds, institutions, geographic coverage, etc.) are normally 
made at a political level, without consulting rural partnerships 
or even lower levels of public administration. Such a politi-
cal, institutional environment does not particularly favour the 
effective implementation of the LEADER method.
The recent empirical study ‘Transleader’, undertaken 
by some Hungarian LAG managers with the support of 
researchers, concentrated on the practices and practical cir-
cumstances of LEADER implementation. They compared 
the Hungarian experience with some of the most successful 
LEADER regions in the EU-15 (Andalusia in Spain, Austria, 
Finland and Ireland). The research concluded that three fac-
tors were particularly important for success: (1) multi-level 
governance, (2) stability and (3) learning, and that many of 
the problems and failures of the Hungarian LEADER could 
be explained along these lines.
The ‘practical manifestation’ of multi-level governance 
seemed to be the most crucial element. In successful areas 
LEADER is normally implemented by a network of institu-
tions, through relations characterised by trust, real partner-
ship and the spirit of cooperation at each level and in each 
direction (from LAGs to the Managing Authorities). This 
equally holds true for Finland, endowed with developed 
democratic traditions and self-governance, and Andalusia, 
with a political and institutional culture very similar to the 
Hungarian one. In Hungary and Poland, as we argued above, 
important path dependent aspects, such as weak traditions in 
participatory democracy, strong tendencies for centralisation 
or the general lack of ‘trust culture’ in public life jeopard-
ise the functioning of multi-level governance. This, conse-
quently, seriously hampers the chances for implementing the 
LEADER method.
Stability, again on a practical level, meant here a stable 
institutional and legislative environment for implementation, 
with suffi cient capacities (fi nancial, human and institutional) 
at every level of the system. In successful LEADER regions 
many people working in LAGs and at higher administrative 
levels remain in place for a long time (often for 10-15 years), 
preserving knowledge, human and network capital. Institu-
tions (from LAG management to Management Authority) 
had enough personnel and money to perform their tasks suf-
fi ciently, and strategies and important legislation were only 
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changed when it was absolutely necessary (namely after the 
CAP mid-term review). All this resulted in a fairly simple, 
transparent, predictable and stable system. In Hungary, 
political (and economic) lobbies had strong infl uences even 
on the everyday steering of the RDP, using the programme to 
create political capital. Institutions, responsible people and 
legislation were changing rapidly10 and there was not enough 
capacity to follow all the changes. All this resulted in a rather 
unclear, ever-changing environment where ad-hoc decisions 
supported by a shadow system of personal connections and 
insider information were often overruling implementation.
Institutionalised learning processes also seemed to have 
a strong effect on the results of LEADER implementation. 
Although an effective evaluation methodology is still miss-
ing at the EU level, ways to collect experiences and to create 
knowledge, allowing for learning from mistakes in order to 
improve future strategies and implementation processes of 
LEADER, could be found all over the place. This institu-
tional learning was in strong connection with stability and 
continuity on the one hand (see above) and with publicity 
and transparency on the other. According to Transleader, in 
the practice of the EU-15, draft legislative proposals and 
strategic documents are normally made available for public 
consultation already in their preparatory phase. Stakehold-
ers can comment on them, feeding in real/practical experi-
ence saving much future debate and trouble. In Hungary the 
culture of public consultation is very weak, documents are 
normally ‘kept secret’ from the public until they are almost 
ready, thus only some of the stakeholders can infl uence the 
process. Evaluation is also mainly concentrated on the stand-
ard requirements of the Common Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework. Thus, there is little chance for the improvement 
of the programme and implementation practices based on 
institutional learning.
Conclusions and outlook
In this paper we explored the Europeanisation of rural 
policies in Hungary and Poland from the perspective of euro-
peanisation. We found that the Eastern enlargement, instead 
of creating a ‘safe haven’ for the New Rural Paradigm, rein-
forced agricultural lobbies and turned CEE countries into 
strongholds of industrial agriculture within the enlarged EU. 
At the same time, however, rural development policies based 
on the LEADER method and implemented through complex 
institutional structures were introduced and shook up rural 
society in Poland and Hungary. Despite its promises and the 
early enthusiasm, LEADER as a rural development model 
proved to be diffi cult to operate in the post-socialist countries 
(Nemes et al., 2014). It was expected to form an alternative 
to the existing policy system in both Hungary and Poland. 
Especially the civil society and the small enterprise sector 
considered it as a panacea against traditional centralisation 
and malfunctioning of governance mechanisms. Neverthe-
10  Between 2007 and 2013 the head of the unit responsible for LEADER within the 
Hungarian Management Authority was changed at least four times. In 2013, in the 
responsible ‘LEADER unit’ within the central paying agency the person having the 
longest experience with LEADER payments had been working there for two years, all 
the others were more recent employees or came from other departments. The legal act 
regulating the implementation of LEADER was modifi ed more than 50 times.
less, bottom-up processes encountered strong resistance of 
central institutions and the public sector at the local level, 
hindering effi cient implementation. A number of reasons 
can be found for all this, however, most of them point back 
to two aspects: (a) the lack of genuine decentralisation and 
well-performing multi-level governance structures, and (b) 
the lack of ability of public administration to learn and to 
work in a project environment in an effi cient, refl exive way.
At fi rst sight, rural policies in Hungary and Poland are 
‘completely Europeanised’. Institutional and legislative 
structures, payments, monitoring and evaluation systems are 
all in place, according to EU requirements. However, many 
things beyond the façade (the culture of co-operation, open 
public debate, institutional learning and above all ‘trust’ that 
would glue the system together) are very often lacking. In 
its current form, Europeanisation is mainly a top-down pro-
cess, where EU rural development policy seems to disregard 
disparities and diversities across the regions (Maurel, 2008; 
Saraceno, 2013). We agree here with Gorton et al. (2010) 
that “the unwillingness of the European Union to come to 
terms with the different underlying historical and socio-
economic conditions of rural areas in the NMS has led to the 
implementation of a policy which is ill-suited for meeting its 
objectives in an enlarged Europe” (p.1315).
On the other hand, the EU legislation leaves quite a spa-
cious room for manoeuvre and therefore it is up to Member 
States how they programme and negotiate details of their 
rural policy delivery systems. In practice, these systems are 
as many as the EU Member States and even regions (ENRD, 
2011). Key directions of the post-2013 CAP, such as the 
increasing focus of RDPs on environmental concerns and the 
primary sector seem to reinforce the ‘renationalisation’ of 
the CAP. At the same time, recent policy developments, both 
in Poland and Hungary, can be seen as disadvantageous for 
rural development – reduced fi nances for LEADER, diffi -
culties in incorporating CLLD and multi-funding in Partner-
ship Agreements etc. With intensifying agricultural lobbies 
and weakening EU guidance, falling behind mainstream EU 
rural development processes based on CLLD, multi-funding, 
short food chains, modulation etc. might become a real dan-
ger for some CEE countries. This could mean the loss of 
many positive rural development results of previous Europe-
anisation and tak ing a reactionary path, reinforcing agricul-
ture again over other parts of the rural economy and society.
The diffi culty in assessing policy delivery in this regard 
lays in the complexity of institutional development that is 
not prone to defi nitive ‘solutions’ or the ‘accomplishment’ of 
realising predefi ned policy targets. The system of European 
and domestic rural policies is presently changing rapidly. 
To follow the development trajectory, comparative, trans-
disciplinary research is needed. This should engage quanti-
tative and qualitative researchers and a wide variety of rural 
stakeholders. Investigations should particularly embrace 
the intangible properties of rural policies, moving beyond 
the existing formal policy evaluation frameworks. A much 
stronger focus on qualitative and participative approaches 
could possibly improve our chances to be able to reinforce 
good directions and warn policy makers about future dangers 
in time for taking preventive action (High and Nemes, 2007; 
Augustyn, 2009c; Dax et al., 2014).
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